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Abstract. Often evidence from a single case does not reveal any suspicious pat-
terns to aid investigations in forensic accounting and other forensic fields. In 
contrast, correlation of sets of evidence from several cases with suitable back-
ground knowledge may reveal suspicious patterns. Link Discovery (LD) has re-
cently emerged as a promising new area for such tasks. Currently LD mostly re-
lies on deterministic graphical techniques. Other relevant techniques are Bayes-
ian probabilistic and causal networks. These techniques need further develop-
ment to handle rare events. This paper combines first-order logic (FOL) and 
probabilistic semantic inference (PSI) to address this challenge. Previous re-
search has shown this approach is computationally efficient and complete for 
statistically significant patterns. This paper shows that a modified method can 
be successful for discovering rare patterns. The method is illustrated with an 
example of discovery of suspicious patterns.  
1. Introduction  
Forensic accounting is a field that deals with possible illegal and fraudulent finan-
cial transactions [3]. One current focus in this field is the analysis of funding mecha-
nisms for terrorism where clean money (e.g., charity money) and laundered money 
are both used [1] for a variety of activities including acquisition and production of 
weapons and their precursors. In contrast, traditional illegal businesses and drug traf-
ficking make dirty money appear clean [1].  
There are many indicators of possible suspicious (abnormal) transactions in tradi-
tional illegal business. These include (1) the use of several related and/or unrelated 
accounts before money is moved offshore, (2) a lack of account holder concern with 
commissions and fees [2], (3) correspondent banking transactions to offshore shell 
banks [2], (4) transferor insolvency after the transfer or insolvency at the time of 
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transfer, (5) wire transfers to new places [4], (6) transactions without identifiable 
business purposes, and (7) transfers for less than reasonably equivalent value [5].  
Some of these indicators can be easily implemented as simple flags in software. 
However, indicators such as wire transfers to new places produce a large number of 
'false positive' suspicious transactions. Thus, the goal is to develop more sophisticated 
mechanisms based on interrelations among many indicators. To meet these challenges 
link analysis software for forensic accountants, attorneys and fraud examiners such as 
NetMap, Analyst's Notebook and others [4-7] have been and are being developed. 
Here we concentrate on fraudulent activities that are closely related to terrorism 
such as transactions without identifiable business purposes. The problem is that often 
an individual transaction does not reveal that it has no identifiable business purpose or 
that it was done for no reasonably equivalent value. Thus, we develop a technique that 
searches for suspicious patterns in the form of more complex combinations of transac-
tions and other evidence using background knowledge.  
The specific tasks in automated forensic accounting related to transaction monitor-
ing systems are the identification of suspicious and unusual electronic transactions 
and the reduction in the number of 'false positive' suspicious transactions by using 
inexpensive, simple rule-based systems, customer profiling, statistical techniques, 
neural networks, fuzzy logic and genetic algorithms [1]. This paper combines the 
advantages of first-order logic (FOL) and probabilistic semantic inference (PSI) [8] 
for these tasks. We discover the following transaction patterns from ordinary or dis-
tributed databases that are related to terrorism and other illegal activities: 
• a normal pattern (NP) – a Manufacturer Buys a Precursor & Sells the Result of 
manufacturing (MBPSR);  
• a suspicious (abnormal) pattern (SP) – a Manufacturer Buys a Precursor & Sells 
the same Precursor  (MBPSP); 
• a suspicious pattern (SP) – a Trading Co. Buys a Precursor and Sells the same 
Precursor Cheaper (TBPSPC );                    
• a normal pattern (NP) -- a Conglomerate Buys a Precursor & Sells the Result of 
manufacturing (CBPSR).      
  
2. Example 
Consider the following example. Table 1 contains transactions with the attributes 
seller, buyer, item sold, amount, cost and date and Table 2 describes the types of 
companies and items sold. 
Table 1. Transactions records 
Record ID Seller Buyer Item sold Amount Cost Date 
1 Aaa Ttt Td 1t $100 03/05/99 
2 Bbb Ccc Td 2t $100 04/06/98 
3 Ttt Qqq Td 1t $100 05/05/99 
4 Qqq Ccc Pd 1.5t $100 05/05/99 
5 Ccc Ddd Td 2.0t $200 08/18/98 
6 Ddd Ccc Pd 3.0t $400 09/18/98 
 
 
We assemble a new Table 3 from Tables 1 and 2 to look for suspicious patterns. 
For instance, row 1 in Table 3 is a combination of row 1 from Table 1 and rows 1 and 
4 from Table 2 that contain types of companies and items. Table 3 does not indicate 
suspicious patterns immediately, but we can generate pairs of records from Table 3 
that can be mapped to patterns listed above using a pattern-matching algorithm A. The 
algorithm A analyzes pairs of records in Table 3. For simplicity, we can assume that a 
new table with 18 attributes is formed to represent pairs of records from Table 3. Each 
record in Table 3 contains nine attributes.   
 
Table 2. Company types and item types 
Record ID Company name 
(seller/buyer) 
Company type Item Item type in process PP 
1 Aaa Trading  Td Precursor  
2 Bbb Unknown Pd Product 
3 Ccc Trading Rd Precursor 
4 Ttt Manufacturing   
5 Ddd Manufacturing   
6 Qqq Conglomerate   
Table 3. Combined data records 






Item type Amount Price Date 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Aaa trading Ttt Manuf. Td Precursor 1t $100 03/05/99 
2 Bbb unknown Ccc Trading Td Precursor 2t $100 04/06/98 
3 Ttt manuf. Qqq Congl. Td Precursor 1t $100 05/05/99 
4 Qqq Congl. Ccc Trading pd Product 1.5t $100 06/23/99 
5 Ccc Trading Ddd Manuf. td Precursor 2.0t $200 08/18/98 
6 Ddd Manuf Ccc Trading pd Product 3.0t $400 09/18/98 
 
Thus, we map pairs of records in Table 3 into patterns:   
A(#5,#6)=MBPSR, that is a pair of records #5 and #6 from Table 3 indicates a normal 
pattern -- a manufacturer bought a precursor and sold product ; 
In contrast, two other pairs indicate suspicious patterns:  
A(#1,#3)= MBPSP, that is a manufacturer bought a precursor and sold the same pre-
cursor; 
A(#2,#5)= TBPSPC, that is a trading company bought a precursor and sold the same 
precursor cheaper. 
Now let us assume that we have a database of 105 transactions as in Table 1. Then 
Table 3 will have all pairs of them, i.e., about 5*109. Statistical computations can 
reveal a distribution of these pairs into patterns as shown in Table 4.   
Table 4.  Statistical characteristics 
Pattern Type Frequency, % Approximate number of cases 
MBPSR normal 55 0.55*5*109 
MBPSP suspicious 0.1    100 
CBPSR normal 44.7 0.44*5*109 
TBPSPC suspicious 0.2     200 
 
Thus, we have 300 suspicious transactions. This is 0.3% of the total number of 
transactions and about 6*10-6% of the total number of pairs analyzed. It shows that 
finding such transactions is like finding a needle in a haystack. The automatic genera-
tion of patterns/hypotheses descriptions is a major challenge. This includes generating 
MBPSP and TBPSPC descriptions automatically. We do not assume that we already 
know that MBPSP and TBPSPC are suspicious.  One can ask:  “Why do we need to 
discover these definitions (rules) automatically?” A manual way can work if the num-
ber of types of suspicious patterns is small and an expert is available. For multistage 
money-laundering transactions, this is difficult to accomplish manually. It is possible 
that many laundering transactions were processed before money went offshore or was 
used for illegal purposes. Our approach to identify suspicious patterns is to discover 
highly probable patterns and then negate them. We suppose that a highly probable 
pattern should be normal. In more formal terms, the main hypothesis (MH) is:  
If Q is a highly probable pattern (>0.9) then Q constitutes a normal pattern 
and not(Q) can constitute a suspicious (abnormal) pattern.    
Table 5 outlines an algorithm based on this hypothesis to find suspicious patterns. The 
algorithm is based first-order logic and probabilistic semantic inference [8]. 
Table 5. Algorithm steps for finding suspicious patterns based on the main hypotheis (MH) 
Discover patterns in a database such as MBPSR in a form MBP ⇒SR, that is, as a Horn 
clause A1&A2&…&An-1⇒ An (see [8] for mathematical detail).  
1.1.Generate a set of predicates Q={Q1,Q2,…,Qm} and first order logic sentences 
A1,A2,…,An  based on those predicates. For instance, Q1 and A1 could be defined as fol-
lows: Q1 (x)=1  x is a trading company and A1(a,b)= Q1 (a)& Q1 (b), where a and b are 
companies. 
1.2. Compute a probability P that pattern A1&A2&…&An-1⇒ An is true on a given data-
base. This probability is computed as a conditional probability  of conclusion An under 
assumption that If-part A1&A2&…&An-1 is true, that is P(An/A1&A2&…&An-1)= 
=N(An/A1&A2&…&An-1)/N(A1&A2&…&An-1&An), where N(An/A1&A2&…&An-1) is the 
number of An/A1&A2&…&An-1 cases and  N(A1&A2&…&An-1&An) is the number of  
A1&A2&…&An-1&An  cases.  
1.3. Compare P(A1&A2&…&An-1⇒ An) with a threshold T, say T=0.9.   
If P(A1&A2&…&An-1⇒ An )>T then a database is “normal”. A user can select another 
value of threshold T, e.g., T=0.98. If P(MBP⇒ SR)=0.998, then DB is normal for 0.98 too.  
1 
1.4. Test statistical significance of P(A1&A2&…&An-1⇒ An). We use the Fisher criterion 
[8] to test statistical significance. 
2 Negate patterns. If database is “normal”  (P(A1&A2&…&An-1⇒ An) >T=0.9 and 
A1&A2&…&An-1⇒ An is statistically significant then negate A1&A2&…&An-1⇒ An to 
produce a negated pattern  A1&A2&…&An-1⇒ ┐An.  
3 Compute the probability of the negated pattern P(A1&A2&…&An-1⇒ ┐An ) =  
1- P( A1&A2&…&An-1⇒ An).  
In the example above, it is 1-0.998=0.002. 
 
4 Analyze database records that satisfy A1&A2&…&An-1 &  ┐An. for possible false alarm. 
Really suspicious records satisfy the property A1&A2&…&An- & ┐An , but normal records 
also can satisfy this property.  
 
To minimize computations we generate randomly a representative part of all pos-
sible pairs of records such as shown in Table 4. Then an algorithm finds highly prob-
able (P>T) Horn clauses. Next, these clauses are negated as described in Table 5.  
After that, a full search of records in the database is performed to find records that 
satisfy the negated clauses. According to our main hypothesis (MH) this set of records 
will contain suspicious records and the search for “red flag” transactions will be sig-
nificantly narrowed. Use of the property of monotonicity is another tool we use to 
minimize computations. The idea is based on a simple observation: If 
A1&A2&…&An-1⇒ B represents a suspicious pattern then A1&A2&…&An-1&An⇒ B 
is suspicious too. Thus, one does not need to test clause A1&A2&…&An-1 &An⇒ B   
if A1&A2&…&An-1 ⇒ B is already satisfied. 
3. Hypothesis Testing  
One of the technical aims of this paper is to design tests and simulation experi-
ments for this thesis. We designed two test experiments: 
1. Test 1: Generate a relatively large Table 4 that includes a few suspicious records 
MBPSP and TBPSPC. Run a data-mining algorithm (MMDR [8]) to discover as 
many highly probable patterns as possible. Check that patterns MBPSR and 
CBPSR are among them. Negate MBPSR and CBPSR to produce patterns MBPSP 
and TBPSPC. Run patterns MBPSP and TBPSPC to find all suspicious records 
consistent with them.  
2. Test 2: Check that other highly probable patterns found are normal; check that their 
negations are suspicious patterns (or contain suspicious patterns).  
A positive result of Test 1 will confirm our hypothesis (statement) for MBPSR and 
CBPSR and their negations. Test 2 will confirm our statement for a wider set of pat-
terns. In this paper we report results of conducting Test 1. The word “can” is the 
most important in our statement/hypothesis. If the majority of not(Q) patterns are 
consistent with an informal and intuitive concept of suspicious pattern then this hy-
pothesis will be valid.  If only a few of the not(Q) rules (patterns) are intuitively sus-
picious then the hypothesis will not be of much use even if it is formally valid.  
A method for Test 1 contains several steps:  
• Create a Horn clause: MBP  ⇒ SR.  
• Compute a probability that MBP ⇒ SR is true on a given database. Probability 
P(MBP ⇒ SR) is computed as a conditional probability  
     P(SR/MBP) = N(SR/MBP)/N(MBP), where N(SR/MBP) is the number of MBPSR 
cases and N(MBP) is the number of MBP cases.   
• Compare P(MBP ⇒ SR) with 0.9.  If P(MBP ⇒ SR)>0.9 then a database is ‘nor-
mal”.  For instance, P(SR/MBP) can be 0.998.  
• Test the statistical significance of P(MBP ⇒SR). We use Fisher criterion [8] to test 
statistical significance.  
• If the database is “normal” (P(MBP ⇒ SR) >T=0.9) and if P(MBP ⇒SR)  is statis-
tically significant then negate MBP=>SR to produce ┐(MBP ⇒SR). Threshold T 
can have another value too.   
• Compute probability for a negated pattern P(MBP ⇒ ┐(SR)). In the example above 
it is 1-0.998=0.002. 
• Analyze database records that satisfy MBP and  ┐(SR). For instance, really suspi-
cious MBPSP records satisfy property MBP and ┐(SR), but other records also can 
satisfy this property too. For instance, MBPBP records (a manufacturer bought a 
precursor twice) can be less suspicious than MBPSP.  
Thus, if the probability P(SR/MBP) is high (0.9892)  and  statistically significant 
then a normal pattern MBPSR is discovered.  Then suspicious cases are among the 
cases where MBP is true but the conclusion SR is not true. We collect these cases and 
analyze the actual content of the then-part of the clause MBP =>SR. The set ┐SR can 
contain a variety of entities. Some of them can be very legitimate cases. Therefore, 
this approach does not guarantee that we find only suspicious cases, but the method 
narrows the search to a much smaller set of records. In the example above the search 
is narrowed to 0.2% of the total cases. 
4. Experiment 
We generated two synthesized databases with attributes shown in Table 4. The 
first one does not have suspicious records MBPSP and TBPSPC. A second database 
contains few such records. Using a Machine Method for Discovery Regularities 
(MMDR) [8] we were able to discover MBPSR and CBPSR normal patterns in both 
databases.  
Table 6. Database with suspicious cases 
Probability P(A1&A2&…&An-1⇒ An ) Pattern 
In database without 
suspicious cases 
In database with 
suspicious cases 
 Normal pattern, MBP ⇒ SR > 0.95 >0. 9 
 Negated pattern  MBP ⇒ ┐(SR) < 0.0.5 < 0.1 
 Normal pattern CBP=> SR >0.95 > 0.9 
 Negated pattern  CBP ⇒  ┐(SR) <0.05 < 0.05 
 
The MMDR method worked without any advanced information that these patterns 
are in data. In the database without suspicious cases, negated patterns MBP ⇒ ┐(SR) 
and CBP ⇒  ┐(SR) contain cases that are not suspicious. For instance, MBP ⇒BP, 
that is, a manufacturer that already bought precursors (transaction record 1) bought 
them again (transaction record 2). The difference in probabilities for MBP ⇒ ┐(SR) in 
the two databases points out actually suspicious cases. In our computational experi-
ments, the total number of regularities found is 41. The number of triples of compa-
nies (i.e., pairs of transactions) captured by regularities is 1531 out of total 2772 tri-
 
ples generated in the experiment. Table 7 depicts some statistically significant regu-
larities found. Attributes New_Buyer__type and New_Item_type belong to the second 
record in a pair of records (R1,R2).  Individual records are depicted in table 3.  
Table 7. Computational experiment: examples of discovered regularities 
# Discovered regularity Frequency 
1 IF Seller_type = Manufacturing  AND Buyer__type = Manufacturing   
THEN New_Item_type = product   
72 / (6 + 72) = 
0.923077 
2 IF Seller_type = Manufacturing  AND New_Buyer__type = Manufactur-
ing THEN New_Item_type = product   
72 / (6 + 72) = 
0.923077 
3 IF Seller_type = Manufacturing  AND Item_type = precursor   
THEN New_Item_type = product   
152 / (59 + 152) 
= 0.720379 
4 IF Seller_type = Manufacturing AND Price_Compare =  1   AND 
New_Buyer__type = Trading  THEN New_Item_type = product   
47 / (2 + 47) = 
0.959184 
5 IF Seller_type = Manufacturing  AND Price_Compare =  1   AND 
Item_type = precursor  THEN New_Item_type = product   
79 / (5 + 79) = 
0.940476 
5. Conclusion 
The method outlined in this paper advances pattern discovery methods that deal 
with complex (non-numeric) evidences and involve structured objects, text and data 
in a variety of discrete and continuous scales (nominal, order, absolute and so on). 
The paper shows potential application of the technique for forensic accounting. The 
technique combines first-order logic (FOL) and probabilistic semantic inference 
(PSI). The approach has been illustrated with an example of discovery of suspicious 
patterns in forensic accounting.  
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